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PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE AND MASS ATROCITIES 
WITHIN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
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School of Political Science and International Studies, The University of Queensland.
d.mayersen@uq.edu.au
At the World Summit in 2005, United Nations Member States unanimously endorsed the 
‘Responsibility to Protect’.  This acknowledged the responsibility of states to protect their 
populations from genocide and mass atrocities, but also that of the international community, 
acting “through the United Nations”.  A strong focus of the statement is on the necessity of 
prevention, and the appropriate “diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means” the 
United Nations can employ in its service.  But what capacity does the United Nations 
currently have to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity and ethnic cleansing through preventative action?  Is it adequate, or are there areas 
where capacity building is required?  This paper will explore the current capacity to meet the 
preventive component of the responsibility to protect within the United Nations system.  It 
will identify areas of strength that might be more explicitly utilised in support of prevention 
measures, and areas in which there are opportunities for improvement.  It will also consider 
the potential of mainstreaming Responsibility to Protect considerations across the United 
Nations system, and the potential for UN involvement in contributing to longer-term, 
structural prevention.  
INTRODUCTION
Unanimity is rare at the United Nations.  It is a testament to the strength of world opinion, 
therefore, that the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ was unanimously endorsed by the international 
community at the World Summit in 2005.  The Responsibility to Protect, or RtoP as it is 
commonly known, reaffirmed the responsibility of the international community to prevent 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and highlighted the 
central role of the United Nations (UN) in meeting this responsibility.  It asserted a broad role 
for the UN; not only responding to crises and imminent emergencies, but also providing an 
early warning mechanism, supporting the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, 
and supporting the international community in taking preventive action to assist “those which 
are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.”1  The endorsement of RtoP is certainly 
a positive step for mass atrocity prevention.  Yet the scope of the challenge is daunting.  The 
twentieth century earned the moniker ‘the century of genocide’; the bloodiest in world 
history.  The record of the UN itself was far from blameless, particularly with respect to the 
1994 Rwandan genocide and 1995 genocide in Srebrenica.  Moreover, as recently as 2009 the 
Secretary-General acknowledged the UN remained “underprepared” to meet it’s “most 
fundamental prevention” responsibilities with respect to RtoP.2  The present article, therefore, 
seeks to explore the current capacity of the UN system to meet these responsibilities for mass 
atrocity prevention.  Through examining key organs of the UN system, it will consider areas 
of strength, and gaps within the present capacity.  It will explore possible approaches to 
augmenting capacity, including within specific organs and through mainstreaming RtoP 
considerations.  Finally, it will also consider the capacity of the UN system to contribute to 
longer-term, structural prevention.  
A History of Rhetoric and Inaction
“There can be no more important issue, and no more binding obligation, than the prevention 
of genocide. Indeed, this may be considered one of the original purposes of the United 
Nations.”3
Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General, January 2004
The prevention of genocide has been a core goal of the United Nations since its inception in 
the aftermath of World War Two.  In 1946, in its inaugural session, General Assembly 
resolution 96 (I) declared “genocide is a crime under international law which the civilised 
world condemns.” 4 It invited Member States to enact domestic legislation for the prevention 
and punishment of genocide, and recommended “that international cooperation be organised 
between States” for this purpose.5  It further requested that a convention on the crime be 
drafted for consideration at the next regular session of the General Assembly.  The resulting 
Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide was finalised 
with astonishing speed and adopted by the General Assembly on 9 December 1948.  It is 
regarded as the first “modern human rights treaty”, being adopted even before the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.6
Yet in the six decades since the Genocide Convention came into force in 1951, it is widely 
recognised that the record of the UN in preventing genocide has been abysmal.  The UN 
commitment to genocide prevention, while consistent at the rhetoric level, failed to translate 
into meaningful preventive action.   During the period of the Cold War, the UN was 
paralysed by the hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union.  It was unable to 
respond to the genocides in Bangladesh or Cambodia, or to act in a pre-emptory capacity “to 
prevent” the commission of genocide.  In the post-Cold War era, there was renewed hope that 
the United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, could serve as the ‘global 
peacekeeper’.7  This was quickly dashed by the massive failures of the UN system associated 
with the 1994 Rwandan genocide and 1995 genocide in Srebrenica.  In Rwanda, for example, 
the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) largely withdrew as the 
genocide commenced.  The mass killing progressed unimpeded as the UN Security Council 
bickered over an appropriate course of action.  Later, the Independent Inquiry commissioned 
to investigate UN actions concluded: 
The response of the United Nations before and during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda failed in 
a number of fundamental respects.  The responsibility for the failings of the United Nations to 
prevent and stop the genocide in Rwanda lies with a number of different actors, in particular 
the Secretary-General, the Secretariat, the Security Council, UNAMIR and the broader 
membership of the United Nations.8
In Srebrenica, the failure of the UN-declared ‘safe area’ led to the slaughter of over 7000 
Bosnian men and boys.  Again, a subsequent report recognised the failure of the UN “to help 
save the people of Srebrenica from the Serb campaign of mass murder.”9
Yet despite these massive failures there have been relatively few calls for international efforts 
to prevent genocide and mass atrocities to move beyond the United Nations.  Even the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervention in Kosovo, despite its largely successful 
mission, provoked controversy rather than increased support for actors working outside the 
UN system.  While the NATO intervention undoubtedly saved Kosovo Albanian civilians 
from being targeted by Serb forces, the absence of a UN Security Council resolution 
authorising the military action led to adverse international reaction.  As the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) subsequently remarked, “The 
task is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the 
Security Council work much better than it has.”10  The UN retains a unique universal 
legitimacy, and remains “unquestionably the principal institution for building, consolidating 
and using the authority of the international community.”11  Ongoing efforts to prevent 
genocide and mass atrocities have thus continued to focus upon improving the capacity of the 
UN system, the political will of key Member States, and learning lessons from the failures of 
the recent past.  
The Responsibility to Protect
In the last decade, much of this effort has centred around the new norm of the ‘Responsibility 
to Protect’.  The concept of RtoP emerged from the ICISS in 2001.  Established partially in 
response to the international failure to respond to the Rwandan genocide, the Commission 
sought to reconceptualise the potential conflict between state sovereignty and humanitarian 
intervention.  The resulting shift to ‘responsibilities,’ rather than ‘rights,’ reframed the 
discussion.  At the World Summit in 2005, the Responsibility to Protect was unanimously 
endorsed by UN Member States.  Member States acknowledged their primary responsibility 
to protect their populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.  They recognised the value of international assistance in enabling States to meet 
this responsibility.  In the event of a State “manifestly failing” to protect its population, 
responsibility to act “in a timely and decisive manner” fell to the international community, 
acting collectively through the United Nations Security Council.12
Within the Responsibility to Protect is an important preventive component.  Member States 
affirmed “This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their 
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means.”13  The Summit Declaration advocates 
the establishment of an early warning capability at the United Nations; Member States also 
affirmed they “fully support the mission of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on 
the Prevention of Genocide.”14  Additionally, they committed “to helping States build 
capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflicts 
break out.”15  The preventive component of RtoP has attracted particularly strong 
international support.  At the General Assembly discussion on RtoP in July 2009, for 
example, many States focussed particularly on the necessity for prevention.  There is thus 
widespread international agreement on the need for the prevention of genocide and mass 
atrocities, and on the central role of the UN in facilitating and contributing to this task.  
UNITED NATIONS CAPACITY FOR MASS ATROCITY PREVENTION
RtoP delineates a broad yet specific role for the UN in mass atrocity prevention, in a manner 
not previously enunciated.  In the five years since 2005, however, there has been relatively 
little analysis of the current and potential capacity of the UN system to undertake this 
preventive role.  Much greater attention has been given to role of the Security Council when 
mass atrocity crimes have appeared imminent or already been underway.  Integral to RtoP, 
however, is also longer-term preventive work in “capacity building,” and “assisting those 
which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.”16  Furthermore, where such 
analysis has occurred, the results have been concerning.  In 2009, for example, nine years 
after the release of the official reports on UN actions during the Rwandan genocide and the 
fall of Srebrenica, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon acknowledged “many of their 
institutional recommendations, including on early warning, analysis and training, have not 
been fully implemented ... The United Nations and its Member States remain underprepared 
to meet their most fundamental prevention and protection responsibilities.”17  It is only 
through a nuanced analysis that the current capacity of the UN system for prevention 
activities can be assessed, and key strengths and areas for improvement identified.  Of course 
a single paper cannot provide a comprehensive analysis of the full range of UN organs; 
nevertheless this paper seeks to contribute to this goal through selective examination of key 
components of the UN system.  The following section will explore a number of such 
components in turn. 
Office of the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide
The Office of the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG) is the central 
focal point for prevention within the United Nations system.18  With a small staff, this 
recently established office is mandated to collect existing information on “massive and 
serious” human rights and international humanitarian law violations that might lead to 
genocide; act as an early warning mechanism to the Secretary-General, “and through him to 
the Security Council”; make recommendations to the Security Council (through the 
Secretary-General) on preventive actions; and finally “liaise with the United Nations system 
on activities for the prevention of genocide.”19  The OSAPG has developed an ‘Analysis 
Framework’ through which it assesses the risk of genocide.  Eight factors have been 
identified that ‘cumulatively increase risk of genocide’, including tense inter-group relations, 
weak institutional capacity to prevent genocide, the presence of illegal arms, underlying 
motivation to target a group, circumstances that facilitate perpetration of genocide, acts that 
could be elements of genocide, evidence of ‘intent to destroy in whole or in part’, and 
triggering factors such as elections.20  Currently, the Office has identified three central 
priorities.21  First, it seeks to ‘raise awareness’ through high-level events on genocide 
prevention and RtoP, and through training of UN staff and government officials.  Secondly, it 
will “analyse situations of concern”; provide timely advice to the Secretary-General and the 
Security Council; and engage the General Assembly in dialogue on early warning and 
assessment.  Finally, through ‘advocacy’ the Office seeks to “advise the Secretary-General on 
preventive action”, mobilise the UN system “and other key partners”, and conduct advocacy 
missions in cases when they are of particular value.  
Through its mandate, however, the OSAPG is limited specifically to focussing upon genocide 
prevention.  It is beyond the remit of the Office to undertake the wider task of “establishing 
an early warning capability” for the other mass atrocities specified as part of RtoP, including 
ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity.22  Additionally, whereas the 
position of the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide (SAPG) is a full-time, paid 
position with support staff, the corresponding position of the Special Advisor for the 
Responsibility to Protect lacks this institutionalisation.  At present, therefore, the Special 
Advisor for RtoP lacks the capacity to develop an early warning capability for other mass 
atrocities.  This is of particular concern given the “different precursors, root causes, and 
triggers” for each crime, necessitating a tailored approach for information gathering and early 
warning in each case.23  The Secretary-General’s plan to establish a joint office for the 
Special Advisors on the Prevention of Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect may lead to 
an integrated effort to establish the early warning capability for RtoP crimes endorsed in the 
2005 Statement.24  Whether the plan can overcome the financial and other barriers necessary 
for its enactment, however, remains unclear. 
Beyond its own currently developing capacity, there are opportunities for the OSAPG to 
build the capacity of the wider UN system to prevent genocide and mass atrocities.  In 
particular, the OSAPG is well-placed to lead an initiative to operationalise, or ‘mainstream’ 
the preventive component of the Responsibility to Protect throughout the UN system.  With 
appropriate training and awareness, incorporating RtoP considerations into the normal 
operating procedures of relevant UN organs and programs could have a significant impact on 
prevention.  This could include utilising UN agencies and field staff to provide information 
relevant for an early warning system.  It might incorporate the inclusion of specific 
preventive capacity building measures within preventive deployments or development 
assistance programs in at-risk nations.  It may involve extending the conflict-sensitive 
development capabilities of the World Bank to include explicit consideration of RtoP risk 
factors.  The potential of the OSAPG to have a greater impact through utilising the wider UN 
system is substantial.  The small size of the Office and the complexities of inter-agency 
cooperation, however, indicate that at present a strategic approach is most likely to be 
effective.  In particular, a review by the OSAPG of the capacity of the UN system for 
genocide prevention (and mass atrocity prevention should a joint office be established) would 
enable rapid identification of areas where there are opportunities to have maximal impact, 
and areas in which urgent improvement is required.  This review could utilise the 2006 
review of the UN system’s capacity for conflict prevention, undertaking further analysis 
focussing specifically on genocide or the four RtoP crimes.25
There is also scope for a strategic decision regarding the balance between operational 
prevention – designed to have a short to medium term impact in States already at risk of mass 
atrocities – and structural, long-term prevention measures.  According to Lawrence Woocher 
from the Centre for International Confliction Resolution, “The origins and terms of the 
Special Advisor’s mandate strongly suggest the office was intended to concentrate on early 
warning for immediate and medium-term operational prevention rather than long-term 
structural prevention.”26  Yet a narrow focus on operational prevention might overlook the 
potential benefits of structural prevention work.  Furthermore, the Secretary-General’s 2009 
report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect highlighted structural prevention as an 
important component of preventive action.27  Research on the antecedents of genocide 
indicates that many of the risk factors can exist decades in advance of a genocidal event.28  
Moreover, commonly identified risk factors such as economic distress and legal 
discrimination against a minority may require long-term strategies for amelioration.  
The OSAPG is uniquely placed to encourage agencies such as the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP) and the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) to 
incorporate RtoP considerations within their programs, and potentially utilise strategies 
within them that contribute to the structural prevention of genocide and mass atrocities in 
tandem with their own developmental goals.  RtoP researcher Eli Stamnes has suggested a 
‘quiet’ approach to this kind of long-term structural prevention, to avoid “weakening” the 
RtoP concept.29  Indeed, she has advocated avoiding “direct appeals” to the concept of RtoP 
for such structural prevention work.30  This approach, however, may inadvertently undermine 
the perceived importance of structural prevention, and prevent the OSAPG from using the 
persuasive power of RtoP to promote structural prevention.  An alternative might be to 
simply utilise the label of ‘RtoP structural prevention’.  This has the additional appeal of 
enabling States to incorporate measures to reduce risk without being forced to acknowledge a 
pre-existing elevated risk – a politically sensitive issue.  The small size of the OSAPG, and 
the large magnitude of mass atrocity prevention, indicate that leveraging off the wider UN 
system in this way could substantially increase its overall impact.   
Security Council
The Security Council bears primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security 
internationally.31  With a massive agenda and intense pressures upon its resources, it typically 
focuses upon situations of crisis or imminent crisis.32  Its history with respect to the 
prevention of genocide and mass atrocities is most notable for its failure to prevent or curb 
the Rwandan genocide.  Even as the full horror of the genocide became apparent during the 
course of April 1994, the Council failed to respond effectively.  The Council’s (in)action with 
respect to events in Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s, and its dithering and largely ineffective 
response to the situation in Darfur in recent years have further contributed to a reputation of 
failure even in the most dire of circumstances.  Nevertheless, the Security Council does have 
substantial capacity to impact upon the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities.33  The 
primary issue is rather one of political will.34  As the political scientists Wheeler and Egerton 
noted: “The real test of the Summit Declaration is whether it increases the likelihood of the 
Council mustering the political will to act to prevent and halt future humanitarian crises.”35  
A number of the ways in which the Security Council can impact upon the prevention of 
genocide and mass atrocities are enumerated below.  For each of them, however, the critical 
issue of political will remains a key factor in determining the Council’s approach.  
The greatest contribution the Security Council can make to mass atrocity prevention is 
through providing a credible threat of reaction.  Genocide is often a quasi-rational tactic, 
chosen as a deliberate strategy with a realistic prospect of meeting the desired goals of a 
perpetrator regime – however irrational the goals themselves may be.36  A genuine, ongoing 
likelihood of Security Council intervention, however, is likely to change the calculus of 
potential perpetrators.  There are several ways through which the Security Council could 
pursue this goal.  Most ambitiously, there have been multiple proposals for a “rapidly 
deployable, robust military force, which can be threatened or used to deter or halt genocidal 
crimes.”37  Currently, however, there are substantial obstacles associated with this option, 
including political dissension and practical constraints.38  More realistic, perhaps, are formal 
and informal opportunities to change the way the veto, and the threat of veto, are used around 
resolutions pertinent to preventing or curbing mass atrocities.  In recent years, this has 
already undergone something of a process of change: 
The costs of using a veto in the UN Security Council in cases of emerging genocide or mass 
atrocities are now extremely high and the international community generally appears much 
less likely to “look the other way” in such situations than it was even a decade ago.  However, 
ensuring an effective response is another matter.39    
In place of the formal veto, the use of the ‘informal veto’, whereby a resolution is not 
formally put to a vote or is substantially weakened due to a prior indication that a member of 
the P5 is likely to veto it, has come to play an increasingly significant role in relevant 
resolutions.  This has repeatedly occurred in resolutions surrounding the mass atrocities in 
Darfur, both delaying them and weakening their content.40  A stronger and more consistent 
commitment to a “timely and decisive” response to mass atrocity crimes could become a 
deterrent force over time.41  The lack of such a credible threat of reaction, however, can 
substantially undermine wider preventive efforts, such as preventive diplomacy.  Arguably, 
this is the largest and most concerning gap in the present capacity of the UN system for mass 
atrocity prevention.
The Security Council also has a clear opportunity to communicate the importance of mass 
atrocity prevention to the international community through the setting of its agenda.  
Ensuring that potential RtoP crises are rapidly considered, and allowing the Special Advisor 
for the Prevention of Genocide (SAPG) to directly brief the Council when appropriate, would 
effectively communicate that the Council considered these matters of great importance.  In 
the past, this has not always occurred.  In 2005, for example, former SAPG Juan Mendez was 
blocked from briefing the Security Council on his visit to Darfur.42  Additionally, the Security 
Council has an opportunity to contribute directly to mass atrocity prevention through 
authorising peacekeeping operations and preventive deployments with appropriately robust 
mandates.  The United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in Macedonia in 
the 1990s, for example, is widely considered as a successful preventive deployment.   Recent 
research by Erik Melander indicates that statistically, peacekeeping missions appear to 
“reduce the risk that mass killings of civilians will commence in intrastate armed conflicts”.43  
Finally, preventive diplomacy can also be utilised by the Security Council more often, and at 
earlier stages of conflict.44
General Assembly
Apart from the Security Council and the Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, the 
General Assembly is the only other organ of the UN specifically mentioned in the paragraphs 
on RtoP in the World Summit Outcome Document.  The statement asserts: “We stress the 
need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its 
implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law.”45  This 
highlights the important function of the General Assembly with respect to the normative 
development of RtoP.  As the UN’s most representative body, the General Assembly is the 
most appropriate location for intergovernmental dialogue on the concept, and for developing 
consensus around approaches to implementing it.46  In particular, the General Assembly 
provides a forum for discussion of what types of action might contribute to prevention.  
While the General Assembly lacks the power to authorise direct preventive action in a 
specific situation, broad-based support for particular kinds of preventive strategies could 
promote and grant substantial legitimacy to their use in nations ‘under stress’.  Periodic 
discussion of RtoP in the General Assembly can also contribute to ensuring its ongoing 
importance within the international community. 
The General Assembly can contribute directly to the UN’s capacity for mass atrocity 
prevention through providing appropriate funding for the OSAPG or the proposed joint office 
for the SAPG and the Special Advisor for RtoP.  Currently, the OSAPG is funded both 
through the regular budget of the UN and voluntary contributions; in the past, however, a 
proposal for funding for the implementation of RtoP was not supported by the Fifth 
Committee.47  The approval of funding for the proposed joint office, at the appropriate time, 
would improve UN capacity for early warning and prevention of the four RtoP crimes.  
There are only limited opportunities for the General Assembly to directly contribute to 
prevention in specific crises.  In circumstances of major crisis in which the Security Council 
is unable to act due to divisions, there is the possibility of invoking the ‘Uniting for Peace’ 
resolution.  According to this resolution, “in situations where the Security Council fails to 
exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, the 
General Assembly may make recommendations to members for collective measures.”48  As 
the ICISS report acknowledged, however, “The practical difficulty in all of this is to 
contemplate the unlikelihood, in any but very exceptional case, of a two-thirds majority, as 
required under the Uniting for Peace procedure, being able to be put together in a political 
environment in which there has been either no majority on the Security Council, or a veto 
imposed or threatened by one or more permanent members.”49  Nevertheless, the ICISS 
suggested, the possibility of a Uniting for Peace procedure could encourage decisive action 
from the Security Council.50  Additionally, the General Assembly can consider crises not on 
the agenda of the Security Council, both as an alternative to the Council and a mechanism to 
encourage the Council to consider them in turn.51  Overall, however, the General Assembly 
has a fairly limited capacity to contribute to the prevention of genocide and mass atrocities 
beyond at a rhetorical level.  
Secretariat
The Secretariat, headed by the Secretary-General, is the administrative organ of the UN.  
With close to 40,000 staff across several departments and offices the Secretariat is 
responsible for the implementation of UN mandates internationally.52  While a 
comprehensive examination of the departments of the Secretariat is beyond the remit of the 
present paper, the key roles of the Secretary-General and the Department of Political Affairs 
will be considered.  
The Secretary-General
Leading the Secretariat, the Secretary-General has a unique ability to influence the path of the 
UN system. The practical and moral leadership of the Secretary-General is an important 
driver of the implementation of RtoP within the UN.  Successive Secretary-Generals have 
focussed upon the need to progress from a ‘culture of reaction’ to a ‘culture of prevention’ 
with respect both to conflict prevention broadly, and more recently RtoP crimes 
specifically.53  The establishment of the OSAPG, for example, institutionalises a preventive 
approach within the Secretariat.  An established ‘culture of risk aversion’, however, has often 
prevailed over the possibility of preventive action in the past.54  The issue of political will, it 
seems, “remains the essential challenge to a culture of prevention.”55  Nevertheless, the 
current Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, has demonstrated a substantial commitment to mass 
atrocity prevention through the expansion of the role of SAPG from part-time to full-time, 
through expansion of the OSAPG, and through regular reports and statements on RtoP and its 
implementation.  
There are considerable opportunities for the Secretary-General to take further action.  
Understanding of RtoP within parts of the Secretariat remains limited, and high-level 
outreach and training could be beneficial.56  Moreover, the idea of mainstreaming RtoP 
throughout the UN system, including in the standard operating procedures of the departments 
of the Secretariat, is gaining increasing support.57  Incorporating explicit consideration of 
RtoP within the mandates of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (OHCHR), for example, could substantially increase UN capacity for 
preventive action.  The Secretary-General could directly promote this consideration through 
requests for reports to include specific discussion of RtoP where relevant.  In turn, the 
Secretary-General’s reports to the Security Council could incorporate this information, 
highlighting the importance of RtoP considerations in the decision-making process.58
The ‘good offices’ function of the Office of the Secretary-General is an important component 
of the UN’s capacity for mass atrocity prevention.  The good offices function can be 
understood as “the independent political role of the Secretary-General in preventing or 
mediating conflicts among, and more recently within, States.”59  The Secretary-General can 
utilise the good offices function to privately mediate potential RtoP conflicts at times of 
imminent crisis.60  The Secretary-General enjoys a reputation as a reasonably impartial actor, 
in whom many states place a high level of trust.61  Moreover, under Article 99 of the UN 
Charter, the Secretary-General has the opportunity to bring to the attention of the Security 
Council “any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international 
peace and security.”62  Judicious use of this provision, or a gentle reminder of its possible use 
in appropriate situations, may further strengthen this aspect of the Secretary-General’s 
position.
Department of Political Affairs
The Secretariat, and within it the Department of Political Affairs, is the central focal point for 
preventive diplomacy within the UN system.  Since the end of the Cold War, the UN has 
substantially increased its focus upon and capacity for preventive diplomacy.63  These efforts 
have met with at least some success – according to the 2005 Human Security report, they 
have both prevented the escalation of multiple potential conflicts and resulted in a number of 
peace agreements for conflicts already underway.64  In 2006, the Mediation Support Unit was 
established within the DPA “as a central repository for peacemaking experience and a 
clearing house for lessons learned and best practices.”65  Additionally, the ‘Mediation 
Support Standby Team’, established in 2008, “is a five-person expert team that can be 
deployed on short notice to assist UN and non-UN mediation efforts around the world.”66  
Nevertheless, it is well recognised that the DPA’s prevention capacity could be strengthened 
further, and utilised more assertively.67  The endorsement of Secretary-General Ban Ki-
moon’s proposals for strengthening the capacity of the DPA for preventive diplomacy and 
peacemaking would further enhance the capacity of the DPA for mass atrocity prevention.68
Additional areas of Preventive Capacity within the United Nations System
There are a number of further important foci for mass atrocity prevention within the UN 
system.  The judicial organs of the system, including the International Court of Justice, the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the hybrid 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia and International Criminal Court (which 
is independent from the UN but works in cooperation with it), have received considerable 
attention regarding their preventive capacity through a deterrent effect.  As the SAPG has 
commented with respect to these judicial organs within the UN system, “Justice is not only 
one of our main goals; it is in itself an important means of prevention.”69  At times the threat 
of justice does appear to have proved an effective deterrent, such as in 2004 when the SAPG 
reminded leaders in Côte D’Ivoire that could be held criminally liable for exacerbating inter-
ethnic tensions through xenophobic hate speech.70  However the power of deterrence for 
prevention remains controversial and contested.71  
A number of other organs of the UN system can be identified as having a strong potential 
capacity to contribute to mass atrocity prevention, even if that capacity is largely to yet be 
realised.  The Human Rights Council has the potential to contribute substantially, although at 
less than five years old, it has yet to have a meaningful impact.  The Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees also has the potential to integrate specific RtoP considerations 
into its normal operating procedures.  Refugees can be “not only a symptom but often a 
potential cause of RtoP situations;” programs concerning refugees should therefore ideally 
consider and seek to mitigate any identified risks where possible.72  Other organs, discussed 
below, have greater potential for longer-term preventive strategies.  
UNITED NATIONS CAPACITY FOR STRUCTURAL PREVENTION
Consideration of UN capacity for mass atrocity prevention has predominantly focussed upon 
the capacity for short-term and medium-term preventive action.  Woocher and others have 
suggested that the mandate of the OSAPG advocates the primacy of operational prevention; 
while Stamnes has suggested avoiding the term RtoP altogether when considering structural, 
long-term prevention.73  The political scientist Alex Bellamy has outlined a number of 
potential difficulties associated with incorporating structural prevention within the remit of 
RtoP, including that of establishing direct causal links between structural prevention 
measures and outcomes, and garnering political support.74  As human rights lawyer and 
researcher Susan Harris Rimmer has responded, however, the problem with a narrow focus 
on operational prevention, and measures such as peacekeeping deployments and diplomatic 
crisis management, is that such measures are not truly preventive, but respond to a crisis 
already underway.75 Thus far within the debate, specific UN capacity for structural 
prevention has received scant attention, and even in the few places it has been considered, it 
has typically been only very briefly.76  Yet a careful examination of Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon’s 2009 report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect suggests that structural 
prevention forms an integral component of operationalising RtoP.  As the report notes: 
Expanding development assistance to the “bottom billion” would undoubtedly have a net 
positive effect on preventing crimes and violations relating to the responsibility to protect if 
such assistance is targeted to give the poor and minority groups a stronger voice in their 
societies, enhances equality and social justice, raises their education levels and increases their 
opportunities for meaningful political participation.  However, if additional assistance is 
distributed in a way that exacerbates, rather than narrows, differences in the status and living 
conditions of rival ethnic, religious or cultural communities within these societies, then the 
net effect would be destabilising and could fuel existing tensions and resentments.  Aid 
programmes therefore need to be sensitive both to conflict and to the responsibility to 
protect.77  
The report goes on to identify five “critical” capacities, “drawn from the practice of 
development assistance”.78  These include conflict-sensitive development analysis, 
indigenous mediation capacity and local dispute resolution capacity.  This suggests a clear 
role for structural prevention within a broader preventive framework, and highlights how 
important such work can be. It also builds upon the place accorded to structural prevention 
within the original ICISS elucidation of the concept.79  In the final section of this paper, 
below, UN capacity for structural prevention activities will be assessed.  
United Nations Development Program 
There is strong potential for the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) to make a 
major contribution to the capacity of the UN for mass atrocity prevention through early stage 
structural prevention work.  Mainstreaming specific consideration of RtoP throughout the 
development assistance programs of UNDP could ensure that development assistance is 
delivered in a manner that also contributes to reducing risk factors for genocide and mass 
atrocities.  Programs might specifically target risk factors identified by the OSAPG, such as 
‘tense inter-group relations’ or ‘weak institutional capacity to prevent genocide’, through 
improving indigenous mediation capacity for example.  Much of this work, however, would 
not require the addition of specific programs, but rather involve tailoring existing programs to 
mitigate risk wherever possible.  For example, incorporating RtoP considerations into an aid 
program might involve designing the program to ensure aid is distributed in ways that 
provided equitable access for ethnic minorities, in a manner that does not inflame inter-ethnic 
tensions.  
In particular, there is a great deal of scope for integrating RtoP considerations into programs 
targeting the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  There is substantial commonality 
between many of the MDGs and the types of actions required for mass atrocity prevention. 
Consider, for example, the first MDG, that of eradicating extreme poverty and hunger.  As
former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan enunciated, “Every step taken towards reducing 
poverty and achieving broad-based economic growth ... is a step toward conflict 
prevention.”80  Of course it is important not to oversimplify the relationship between poverty 
and the commission of mass atrocities, and to recognise both that mass atrocities can occur in 
the absence of poverty, and that poverty is not always a risk factor.81  Yet in many cases it 
can be a substantial contributing factor, and addressing poverty is widely regarded as a 
structural prevention measure for reducing the likelihood of RtoP crimes.  Similarly, goal 
eight, that of developing a global partnership for development, is also an excellent example of 
common ground.  From an RtoP perspective, the level of ‘trade openness’ – that is economic 
interdependence – is one of six key predictors of the likelihood of genocide and mass 
atrocities developed through quantitative studies by the political scientist Barbara Harff.82  
Nations with high levels of economic interdependence are far less likely to engage in mass 
atrocity crimes, while economic isolation is a risk factor.  Collaboration can also augment the 
effectiveness of the MDG programs.  At the simplest level, aid is more effective in reducing 
poverty in politically stable nations, while nations exhibiting risk factors for genocide or mass 
atrocities are typically poor and deteriorating environments for meeting the MDGs.83  
Integrating RtoP considerations into UNDP programs targeting the MDGs, therefore, can be 
mutually beneficial for both programs – and most importantly for the recipient nations 
themselves.
Additional areas of Structural Prevention Capacity within the United Nations System
There are also substantial opportunities for the International Financial Institutions and the 
United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) to each contribute to structural 
prevention efforts.  The facility of the World Bank in contributing to conflict prevention 
through institutional capacity-building and conflict-sensitive development analysis has been 
recognised by the Secretary-General.84  Mainstreaming RtoP considerations into the normal 
procedures of the World Bank could contribute to strengthening the institutional capacity to 
prevent genocide in poor nations, for example.  Programs that integrate poverty-reduction and 
risk-mitigation strategies could be mutually reinforcing for mass atrocity prevention.  Finally, 
UNITAR, “a small gem in the crown of the UN,” has a strong capacity to contribute to 
structural prevention work through its extensive training and research capabilities.85
CONCLUSION
The findings of the above review of the capacity for mass atrocity prevention in the UN 
system suggest there is a place for cautious optimism in considering the way forward.  In the 
Secretariat, the OSAPG and through the Secretary-General, there is already a well-
established capacity for operational prevention.  Furthermore, recent reports from both the 
Secretary-General and the OSAPG suggest clear, practical and achievable routes to 
strengthening that capacity further.  There are also opportunities to substantially augment 
capacity for prevention over time through incorporating specific considerations of RtoP 
within normal operating procedures throughout relevant agencies of the UN.  Thus far, there 
has been very little consideration of the capacity of the UN for structural prevention.  The 
Secretary-General’s 2009 report Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, however, 
suggests an important place for structural prevention within the arsenal of preventive action.  
As has been outlined above, there is strong potential for the UN to make a substantial 
contribution to structural prevention through tailoring existing programs to incorporate RtoP 
considerations and goals.  While this would be a challenging undertaking, it is achievable 
within the current UN structure, and has the potential to be of substantial impact over the 
longer term.  Alongside these positive findings, however, there exist concerning gaps within 
the current system, for which no solution appears readily available.  In particular, the capacity 
of the Security Council to effective address situations in which urgent preventive action is 
required is doubtful.  This has the potential to impact upon the effectiveness of other 
preventive actions, many of which are at least partially dependent upon a credible (if implicit) 
threat of reaction.  Unless and until this major gap in capacity is addressed, the capacity of 
the UN for mass atrocity prevention will remain limited and incomplete.  
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